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Deconstruction has become a prominent force in legal theory in the last
few years, especially through its use by feminist scholars and members of
the Critical Legal Studies movement. Yet its appearance on the critical
scene has not been greeted with universal acclaim; many persons are
greatly concerned by the pervasive influence of deconstruction. However,
no matter how great a furor deconstruction has caused in legal circles, it
has caused even greater controversies in literary circles for the last decade
and a half.
John Ellis describes his new book, Against Deconstruction, as an at-
tempt to provide what has heretofore been lacking in literary theory-an
intellectual case against deconstruction." By subjecting deconstruction to
"the tools of reason and logical analysis," Ellis hopes to expose the flaws
of deconstructive writing. More importantly, he hopes to generate a rea-
soned debate about the philosophical underpinnings of deconstruction, a
debate which he sees as never having quite gotten off the ground.2 In
many respects, Ellis is superbly qualified for this task. In addition to be-
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ing a noted scholar of German literature, he has written a book applying
methods of analytic philosophy to traditional problems of literary criti-
cism,' and has also attempted to bring the insights of Ludwig Wittgen-
stein's philosophy to literary theory.4
Nevertheless, Ellis does not quite succeed in his endeavor, for his book
quickly degenerates into a polemic against deconstruction and its foremost
exponent, the French philosopher Jacques Derrida.5 Rather than begin-
ning a dialogue based upon the strongest and most plausible versions of
deconstructive arguments, Ellis is rather too eager to show the reader that
what he is writing about is absurd. Derrida can justly be blamed for not
being the clearest of writers, but he is hardly different from many other
philosophers in the Continental tradition who write in a metaphoric and
hyperbolic style. This way of arguing necessitates paraphrase and retrans-
lation if it is to be understood and evaluated in the rather drier format of
Anglo-American analytical philosophy. Such a project requires considera-
ble patience and sensitivity, and Ellis shows a marked lack of both traits.
Thus, whenever Ellis has a choice between a charitable reading of Der-
rida and a wooden or patently foolish reading, he invariably chooses the
less plausible and more ridiculous reading. He thus ends up betraying the
very values of dispassion, precision, and avoidance of hyperbole that he
complains are lacking in the work of deconstructionists.
Nevertheless, even if Ellis cannot quite manage to avoid the sort of
polemicizing that he purportedly disdains, his book has considerable
value. Even a polemic can raise important issues that deserve response.
Although it is nominally an attack on the work of deconstructive literary
theorists, Ellis' book is quite relevant to lawyers and legal theorists be-
cause it shares many of the concerns and misunderstandings of main-
stream legal academics about deconstructive arguments made by feminists
and Critical Legal Studies scholars.
In Ellis' work one quickly perceives that what has most disturbed crit-
3. J. ELLIS, THE THEORY OF LITERARY CRTrIcIsM: A LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1974).
4. Ellis, Wittgensteinian Thinking in Theory of Criticisin, 12 NEw LITERARY HIST. 437 (1981).
5. See e.g., pp. 43-44 (suggesting that Derrida has deliberately failed to mention Wittgenstein's
work in order to make his own seem more original and revolutionary; his failure to discuss these
matters raises questions that are "unanswerable" ); pp. 80-82, 138-41 (deconstruction always argues
for opposite of whatever it believes to be received tradition, thus producing an interpretation as sim-
plistic as its target); p. 82 (deconstruction advocates "an indiscriminate response to authority," of same
sort as "the slogan of the younger generation in the 1960s: 'Don't trust anyone over thirty' "); pp.
111-12 (deconstructive claim that "all interpretation is misinterpretation" is "an empty piece of pos-
turing," and "an illusion of intellectual tour de force, which is not backed up by any theory of
substance" (emphasis in original)); pp. 141-42, 151 (deconstructive "[fjormulations are chosen not for
their logical or intellectual appropriateness but, instead, for their drama and shock," or their "psycho-
logical appeal"); p. 144 (deconstructionists always view their opponents in "the role of the naive
believer who must be denounced"); pp. 148-50 (deconstructive critics dislike Jonathan Culler's expla-
nations of deconstruction because they can easily be understood by non-deconstructionists; however,
Culler's clarity makes it obvious he has nothing interesting or important to say); pp. 151-52 (decon-
struction gives its adherents a way of being revolutionary and shocking without doing any important
theoretical work).
1670 [Vol. 99: 1669
Nested Oppositions
ics of deconstruction is what they see as deconstruction's apparent denial
of conceptual distinctions thought essential to much literary, legal, and
political discourse. An example of an important distinction in literary the-
ory might be the distinction between interpretation and misinterpretation.
Important distinctions in legal and political theory include the distinctions
between law and politics, public power and private power, interpreting
law and making law, and coercion and consent. Critics have also worried
that deconstructive theory claims that semantic distinctions between words
are incoherent, thereby precluding any possibility of meaningful dis-
course." Most troubling of all is the claim that deconstruction rejects the
laws of logic itself, thus suggesting that all intellectual discussion must
come to an end.7
This essay argues that these fears are ungrounded. To be sure, some
deconstructionists do talk loosely and imprecisely about total incoherence
and indeterminacy, and are often not completely clear about the nature of
the claims that they are making. However, the form of deconstructive
analysis that I advocate does not involve any of the above-mentioned
claims of radical incoherence or indeterminacy. This version of decon-
struction is the type most suitable for use by legal and political theorists.
It is also, I contend, the interpretation that is most charitable to Derrida's
often obscure texts and that makes the most sense of the type of arguments
found within them.
Properly understood and properly used, deconstruction offers theorists a
set of techniques and arguments involving the concepts of similarity and
difference. Because the logic of law is to a large degree the logic of simi-
larity and difference, these issues are of obvious concern to lawyers. As I
shall explain in detail, deconstructive arguments concerning similarity and
difference involve the reinterpretation of conceptual oppositions as what I
shall call "nested oppositions"-that is, oppositions which also involve a
relation of dependence, similarity, or containment between the opposed
concepts. A nested opposition, however, is not a denial that a conceptual
opposition is coherent, real, or useful in some contexts. It is rather a
resituation of the opposition that allows us to see both difference and simi-
larity, both conceptual distinction and conceptual dependence.
The recurring confusion of nested oppositions with claims of false op-
position or nonopposition has caused immense problems for philosophical
as well as legal argument. It has led to the fears about deconstruction
described above, and has generated misunderstanding both among persons
who use deconstruction and among those who criticize its use. I shall ar-
gue that many if not most of Ellis' misunderstandings about deconstruc-
tion arise from this confusion.
6. Pp. 54, 122-24, 127-28, 133-34.
7. See, e.g., pp. 3-11.
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The remainder of the book contains Ellis' attack on the reader-response
school of literary criticism, his views on the declining state of literary criti-
cism today, and deconstruction's place in hastening that decline.' In keep-
ing with the style of the book, these chapters are sharp and provocative;
although they will be quite interesting to literary scholars, I omit discus-
sion of them here. Nevertheless, I will have something to say about Ellis'
defense of linguistic conventionalism, 9 which does have some relevance to
legal issues, and to the question of conceptual oppositions.
I. DECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAWS OF LOGIC
Ellis' agenda is clear from the title of the opening chapter of his book:
"Analysis, Logic, and Argument in Theoretical Discussion." Ellis is con-
cerned that some deconstructionists have claimed that their work is not
susceptible to traditional forms of logical analysis because it relies upon a
different form of logic.' ° In traditional logic, the propositions P and not-P
are mutually exclusive. Ellis believes that the adherents of deconstruction
reject this in favor of a logic which asserts "[n]either/nor, that is, simulta-
neously either or.""' No doubt for someone to insist simultaneously that
"neither P or not-P" and "P and not-P" seems contrary to ordinary prin-
ciples of logic, and it is not surprising that Ellis, who prides himself on
his rigorous analytical approach, is skeptical of such claims. He argues
that "[tihis kind of rhetoric does not advance serious thought or inquiry
but gives an impression of profundity and complexity without the effort
and skill that would be required to make a substantial contribution to the
understanding of the matter under discussion."12 Moreover, he believes it
smacks of religious mysticism, of which he also disapproves.' 3 Ellis com-
plains that
[p]erhaps the most common claim of all here is simply the most gen-
eral of all: that logic, reason, and analysis are insufficient to discuss
Derrida. But . . . this is a claim made with great regularity
throughout human history; attacks on rational thought have occurred
with regularity by mystics, visionaries, and others who were simi-
larly impatient with the constraints of reason.' 4
Ironically, neither Ellis nor the targets of his criticism are quite right
about the logical status of "neither/nor and both/and," although both El-
lis and his targets are right to some degree. Of course, once we use the
8. Pp. 113-36, 153-59.
9. Pp. 45-66.
10. Pp. 3-4.
11. P. 6 (quoting J. DERRIDA, POSITIONS 43 (1981) (emphasis in original)).
12. P. 7.




phrase as I have used it in the last sentence, it should become clear that
deconstructive claims of "neither/nor and both/and" do not necessarily
involve any abandonment of rationality. Rather, these claims are based
upon a form of rationality that is very familiar to us, and which in fact is
essential to the practice of legal and ethical argument. This form of rea-
soning is concerned with establishing the similarity or difference between
objects, concepts, or any other entity.
It is important to understand how this type of reasoning and proposi-
tional logic often talk past each other. The key idea in propositional logic
(and Aristotle's syllogistic logic) is that statements like "Fetuses are Per-
sons" can be translated into symbols that can be manipulated without re-
gard to what they stand for. Thus, one might argue with perfect logical
validity that if all F are P, and if murder is defined as killing a P, then
killing an F is also murder. The formal character of the symbols guaran-
tees that the result is logically valid, regardless of the substantive content
of the symbols. Thus, if we translate "Fetuses are Persons" into "All F's
are P's," or "(x)(F(x) -P(x))," we no longer care what F and P stand for
in our logical calculations. What we prove is logically correct whether F
stands for fetuses or fandango dancers."5
The rationality of similarity and difference, however, is concerned with
the conditions under which we can classify things as being F's or being
P's. Are fetuses enough like the other things we call persons to count as
persons? They have human DNA, they share certain bodily functions of
adult humans, and they are composed of living cells. On the other hand,
all these characteristics are true of one's liver or one's appendix. Are fe-
tuses more like persons or more like your appendix? Are all fetuses
equally like persons, or are some of the things within the category we call
"fetus" more person-like and some more appendix-like, for example fe-
tuses that are eight months old and fetuses that are three weeks old?
These types of questions are the object of the rationality of similiarity and
difference. Here we must patiently compare what things are alike or
unalike, to what extent or for what purpose they are alike or unalike, and
(most importantly) why we want to treat them as alike or unalike. Those
reasons may have little to do with the overt physical characteristics of the
fetus-for example, whether it is composed of a few cells or many-but
may stem from a range of social policies or theories of rights that we think
important to enforce. Thus, we treat the fetus as a person or not as a
person, or as a person in some respects but not in others, because of those
important social policies or theories of rights.
What I have just said must sound obvious to most lawyers. The ration-
15. Note that the statement "all F are P" is true if we replace "fetuses" with "fandango dancers."
If F stands for "forest fires," the statement is not true, but logical inferences based upon the formal
statement "all F are P" continue to be logically valid even if their ultimate conclusion is false.
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ality of similarity and difference is what we mean by legal reasoning in
many respects. It is quite close to what Edward H. Levi meant when he
spoke of legal reasoning as reasoning by analogy.' 6 And such reasoning is
always a matter of degree-things are always alike to some extent, and
always unalike to some extent. Thus, when Derrida and his followers tell
us that things are neither/nor and both/and, we know that they are not
talking nonsense-they are talking like lawyers. (I am, of course, acutely
aware of the question that I have just begged).
Deconstruction offers a general view about the rationality of similarity
and difference, a view that provides a useful set of analytical techniques
for law as well as for the other human sciences. However, to understand
this view, we must first clarify a number of concepts and relate them to
the problem of similarity and difference. They are logical contradiction,
conceptual opposition, and nested opposition.
Logical contradiction is a property of propositions. A logical contradic-
tion involves two terms, a proposition and its logical denial. For example,
if P is a proposition, then a logical contradiction is involved in asserting
simultaneously that P and not-P are both true. A conceptual opposition,
on the other hand, is a property of a relation between concepts in a partic-
ular context-it therefore need not involve a logical contradiction between
propositions. A conceptual opposition consists of three elements-the first
term, the second term, and the context or relationship by which they are
opposed. 7
If we say that red and green are opposite colors in a traffic light, we are
not saying that they logically contradict each other. Rather, they are op-
posed with respect to the meanings these colors are given in traffic signals.
The context of conventions concerning traffic signals makes them oppo-
sites. In another context, they may be seen as similar to each other. For
example, red and green are both colors of the natural spectrum, or colors
associated with Christmas, while lavender and brown are not. Thus red
and green are seen as different in some contexts, and are seen as having
similar properties in others.
Conceptual oppositions are thus intimately related to questions of simi-
larity and difference. A conceptual opposition between A and B is an im-
plicit statement of similarity and difference-an implicit claim of similar-
ity among the things associated with A (or among those associated with B)
and an implicit claim of difference between these two groups. These im-
plicit claims of similarity and difference are made in the context of the
relation that opposes the two poles of the opposition.
A recurring problem in theoretical argument is the confusion of concep-
16. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).




tual opposition with logical contradiction. The problem arises because we
often forget that what produces a conceptual opposition is context and
relation and not logical contradiction. This mistake is easy to make be-
cause many conceptual oppositions look and act like logical contradictions
in particular contexts. Our cultural practices make red and green concep-
tual opposites in the context of a traffic light. It is also true that the same
object cannot be at the same time wholly green and wholly red. Thus it
appears as if statements of the form "This object is red" and "This object
is green" might be logically contradictory, and that to predicate both
properties (red and green) of the same object might involve logical
contradiction.
Nevertheless, statements of logical contradiction are statements that are
inconsistent and also admit of no third alternative. It is not true that eve-
rything must be either green or red, nor is it true that nothing can be both
green and red. Green and red are mutually exclusive in some contexts, but
they do not use up the entire spectrum of color-a sweater can be purple
or grey. And in still other contexts green and red are not even mutually
exclusive, for a green and red striped sweater can be both green and red.' 8
Thus, conceptual oppositions like red and green only give rise to state-
ments of logical contradiction in specific contexts. 9
The confusion between logical contradiction and conceptual opposition
is related to another problem- the mischaracterization of properties that
depend upon context or relation as being acontextual properties of things.
A good example is the property of number. Suppose we have two married
couples. How many are there? There are two couples, but there are four
persons. The property "two" is not a property of them, but of the way in
which they are considered-that is, of the context in which the question is
asked or the property ascribed.
The idea of contextual and relational properties is quite important
when we discuss questions of similarity and difference. For similarity and
difference are the quintessential relational or contextual properties. To
say that two things are the same is always to beg the question, "in what
respect?" or "in what context?"20 The contextuality of similarity and dif-
ference means that conceptual oppositions are only opposed in certain con-
18. So can a traffic signal which is not working correctly.
19. For examples of the recurrent confusion of logical contradiction and conceptual opposition in
philosophy, see T. SEUNG, supra note 17, at 12-17.
20. This may seem at odds with at least one type of identity-self-identity. It might appear that
self-identity is an acontextual property. Yet in fact this is not the case. For example, consider the self-
identity of persons. A person is a child and then she becomes an adult. In one respect she is the same,
but in another she may be quite different, both psychologically and physically. Even inanimate objects
change over time, yet we still say that they are identical. The famous statement of Heraclitus-that
one can never step into the same river twice-is simply another version of this point. Heraclitus
argued that the same is always in the process of becoming different from itself. This metaphorical
language makes sense only when similarity and difference are understood as contextual or relational
properties.
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texts. In other contexts, the terms of the opposition have similarities and
are not opposed.
This brings us to the third and most important concept necessary to
understanding the connection between deconstruction and logic: that of
nested opposition. A nested opposition is a conceptual opposition each of
whose terms contains the other, or each of whose terms shares something
with the other. The metaphor of "containing" one's opposite actually
stands as a proxy for a number of related concepts-similarity to the op-
posite, overlap with the opposite, being a special case of the opposite, con-
ceptual or historical dependence upon the opposite, and reproduction of
the opposite or transformation into the opposite over time. These possible
versions of what I call containment share what Wittgenstein called a
"family resemblance"-they all bear similarities to each other, although
we cannot point to one single property that they all have in common. 1
Deconstruction makes a basic claim about the logic of similarity and
difference: All conceptual oppositions can be reinterpreted as some form of
nested opposition. This follows from the contextual and relational nature
of conceptual oppositions. Because opposition depends upon context and
relation, recontextualization of a conceptual opposition may reveal simi-
larities where before we saw only differences, or historical or conceptual
dependence where before we saw only differentiation. Thus, to decon-
struct a conceptual opposition is to reinterpret it as a nested opposition. It
is to observe simultaneously the similarity and difference, the dependence
and differentiation, involved in a relation between concepts. Deconstruc-
tive argument is simply the means by which this reinterpretation is
achieved. Moreover, because claims of similarity and difference can be
reinterpreted as conceptual oppositions, it follows that claims of similarity
and difference can also be reinterpreted as forms of nested opposition.
The deconstructive concepts of differance and "trace" implicitly rely
upon notions of nested opposition. Differance is used by Derrida to de-
scribe the mutual dependence and differentiation of concepts.22 Mutual
dependence and differentiation, however, is simply one form of nested op-
position. Trace is the retention of absent concepts in our understanding of
other concepts;23 the trace involves a form of conceptual or historical de-
pendence between the present and absent concepts, and thus a nested op-
position between what is nominally present and what is absent. Finally,
deconstructive readings implicitly make use of nested oppositions. For ex-
ample, a standard form of deconstructive reading attempts to invert hier-
archies of concepts found in a text. The deconstructive analysis proceeds
by demonstrating that the opposition between the favored and the disfa-
21. L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 67 (G. Anscombe trans. 3d ed.
1953).
22. See Balkin, Deconstructh,e Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 752-53 (1987).
23. Id.
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vored term in the opposition is really a nested one. In other words, the
goal is to show that the favored or dominant term bears some form of
conceptual dependence to the disfavored or subordinated term.
One might well wonder whether deconstructive theory really claims
that all conceptual oppositions can be reinterpreted as nested oppositions.
Such a translation would not be possible if there were a conceptual oppo-
sition where neither pole bore any element of similarity or conceptual or
historical dependence with respect to its opposite. However, it is always
possible to create a context, no matter how artificial, in which two things
are said to be alike in some respect.2 ' Indeed, we might note that the very
fact that we see the two concepts as opposed, rather than as completely
irrelevant to each other, indicates some basis of similarity or some concep-
tual relation between them.25
It is important to understand that the deconstructive claim that all con-
ceptual oppositions can be reinterpreted as nested oppositions is not a
claim that all conceptual oppositions are incoherent or false oppositions.
For this involves a confusion of similarity with identity. To say that A and
B form a nested opposition is not to say that A is identical with B, or that
it is impossible to tell A and B apart in a particular context. Indeed, the
concept of a nested opposition only makes sense if we assume that there
are points of difference between A and B; otherwise we could not see these
concepts as opposed. Therefore it is a misuse of deconstructive argument
to claim that one can abolish all distinctions and demonstrate that all
forms of intellecutal endeavor lack coherence. For deconstructive argument
itself rests upon the very possibility of those distinctions and those
coherences.
I believe that the richness and utility of the concept of nested opposition
clarifies many of the debates surrounding deconstruction and the accusa-
tions of indeterminacy regularly levelled at it. But this idea, which de-
pends so heavily upon contextualization, is itself best encountered in con-
text. Moreover, the concept of nested opposition is rich because it is
actually a cluster of interrelated concepts. For these reasons, a few exam-
24. For example, even logical contradictions, such as that between P and not-P, can be interpreted
as nested oppositions, if we shift our focus from the opposed meanings of the two propositions to the
opposition between the propositions themselves. We might note that both propositions have in com-
mon the property of being propositions, both involve a statement about a state of affairs P, and each is
dependent for its truth value upon the truth value assigned to the opposite proposition.
25. Nevertheless, this answer suggests that at least some reinterpretations of conceptual opposi-
tions as nested oppositions will be trivial or uninteresting. We might then ask if there is any way of
demarcating in advance those conceptual oppositions that will produce interesting forms of nested
opposition from those that will produce only trivial or uninteresting ones. But we cannot compile such
a list in advance, for triviality and interest, like similarity and difference, are highly contextual
properties. In other words, although deconstructive techniques can be explained formulaically, the
actual practice of deconstruction is not formulaic-it requires sensitivity and creativity on the part of
the deconstructor in discovering interesting or relevant points of similarity or conceptual dependence
between conceptual opposites.
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ples are necessary in order to show how the different forms of nested op-
position work in practice.
A. Nested Oppositions in History and Culture
First, consider a nested opposition of intellectual themes. Suppose a his-
torian asserts that Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton had op-
posed political philosophies. She might point out that Jefferson stood for
the preservation of the yeoman farmer, for individual equality and oppor-
tunity, for local power as opposed to national power, and that Jefferson's
thought emphasized revolutionary flexibility in order to preserve individ-
ual liberty. In contrast, she might argue that Hamilton stood for the
growth of American industry, was complacent about natural and social
inequalities, sought increased centralization of governmental power, and
emphasized the preservation of social order in order to enhance economic
growth.1
6
The example of Jefferson's and Hamilton's philosophies is paradig-
matic of a nested opposition because it is an opposition of cultural or
value-oriented themes. The most common forms of nested opposition arise
in oppositions between historical movements or events, interpretive state-
ments, claims of value, or other products of culture. This is not to say that
nested oppositions cannot occur elsewhere, but merely that these are the
most interesting and important examples.
We might understand this opposition as nested in several different
ways. First, we might recognize that there is considerable overlap between
the philosophies of the two men, as the consensus historians of the 1940's
and 50's argued.27 Both thinkers stated their views against a background
of assumptions involving a capitalist economic system and a liberal demo-
cratic political system. More particularly, both men believed in natural
aristocracies of talent and the institution of private property, and both
objected to government interference with individual initiative. *" We might
say metaphorically that there is a little of Jefferson's philosophy in Ham-
ilton and a little of Hamilton's philosophy in Jefferson. This would not
justify the claim that their philosophies were identical, but it would be a
useful corrective to the notion that they were in all respects opposed.
Second, we might note the degree to which Jefferson's thought came to
resemble Hamilton's after Hamilton's death and Jefferson's ascension to
the presidency. The similarities between Jefferson and Hamilton might
tend to explain why, during his presidency, Jefferson took many steps that
would have been consistent with Hamilton's views on government and
26. See 2 D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME: JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN
286-87 (1951); M. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION 434-35 (1970).
27. See, e.g., L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); R. HOFSTADTER, THE
AmERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1951).
28. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 46-49.
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with the early Federalist position in general.29 Of course, these policies
can be explained on the grounds that Jefferson changed his mind about
these things as he got older, or that he was simply unprincipled. But these
policies are also partially explained by the fact that, as the historical con-
text changed, the similarities between Jefferson's views and Hamilton's
emerged more clearly-that alteration of political and historical context
allowed us to see similarities where before we saw only differences.30
We can see another form of nested opposition between Jefferson's and
Hamilton's philosophies emerge when we attempt to create cultural
themes, or ideal types of Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism.3' For ex-
ample, in his famous work, Main Currents in American Thought, 2
Vernon Parrington argued that American intellectual history can be seen
as a dialectic between Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian philosophies. 33 Jef-
fersonianism might be seen as a belief in egalitarianism, equality of op-
portunity, fluid social and political institutions, and decentralized deci-
sion-making, while Hamiltonianism might stand for promotion of wealth
at the expense of equality, stable social and political institutions, and cen-
tralization of power in national as opposed to local government. Indeed,
once we create these abstractions, it might even make sense to say that a
particular person was more Jeffersonian than Jefferson himself with re-
spect to some issues-imagine a member of Congress who thought that
some of the proposals and acts of the Jefferson Administration were be-
yond Jefferson's authority as President because that person had a narrow
conception of Federal national power or Federal executive power.
The nestedness of a nested opposition often becomes apparent when we
attempt to understand what each of the terms in the opposition means.
Debates over the meaning or content of each side of a nested opposition
replicate the debate over the terms of the original opposition. The struggle
over the meaning or the content of the concept as it is introduced into new
contexts is a struggle that recapitulates the original struggle of
differentiation.
Thus, if we imagine a political debate in 1815 between "radical" Jef-
fersonians and "moderate" Jeffersonians over the constitutionality of an
internal improvements bill, it would not be at all surprising to hear the
moderate Jeffersonians calling for somewhat looser construction of Fed-
eral constitutional powers, or paying somewhat greater attention to the
29. Id. at 43-45, 46, 51; M. PETERSON, supra note 26, at 689, 700-01, 775-76; L. WHITE, THE
JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 6, 35, 111, 131, 146-47, 547-48, 550-51
(1951).
30. In this light, Jefferson's famous remark in his first inaugural address that "[wie are all repub-
licans, we are all federalists," takes on a new meaning. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 43.
31. See generally M. PETERSON, THE JEFFERSON IMAGE IN THE AMERICAN MIND (1960) (re-
counting history of differing interpretations of Jefferson and uses made of concept of Jeffersonianism).
The term "cultural theme" is taken from T. SEUNG, CULTURAL THEMATICS x, passim (1976).
32. V. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (1930) (three volumes).
33. See 3 id. at xxiii-xxiv.
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need for a national policy of stimulating business.34 The moderate Jeffer-
sonians' more radical siblings might accuse them of sounding like mem-
bers of the Federalist party of the late Alexander Hamilton, and in'a
limited sense they would be quite right. In this example the contestants
are not debating the meaning of the term "Jeffersonianism." Rather, this
is a debate among persons who claim all to be Jeffersonians as to what
the principles they believe in truly are. 5 It is less a struggle over the
meaning of a word than the content of a principle associated with a
word. 6
This imaginary debate 37 might end in any number of ways, in each
case manifesting a different version of the nested opposition. First, the
radical Jeffersonians might win and, arguing that they were the true dis-
ciples of Jefferson's thought, kick the moderate Jeffersonians out of their
party. The radicals would then interpret this event as the preservation of
the true meaning of Jeffersonian principles, and the exclusion of
Hamiltonian influences, while the excluded moderates would argue that
true Jeffersonian principles had been betrayed and perverted in the ser-
vice of an unhealthy radicalism. Second, the moderate Jeffersonians might
prevail, label their beliefs as Jeffersonianism, and the disgruntled radicals
would be forced to call themselves something else. In that case, from the
perspective of the moderates the true essence of Jeffersonianism would
have been preserved from dangerous contamination, while from the per-
spective of the radicals Jeffersonianism would have become just the latest
form of Hamiltonianism.38 Third, the two sides might reach some com-
promise and refer to this compromise as the essence of Jeffersonianism,
while disgruntled losers on the left and on the right now accuse the result-
ing compromise of being too Hamiltonian on the one hand and too radical
34. Note that Jefferson himself supported an internal improvements bill, despite his concerns
about its constitutionality, 5 D. MALONE, supra note 26, at 553-60, and many of his staunchest
Republican followers would later oppose it on the same grounds.
35. In this light, consider the election of 1824, in which such different political personalities as
Henry Clay, John Quincy Adams, William Crawford, and Andrew Jackson all claimed to be Jeffer-
sonian Republicans. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON 19 (1945).
36. See 3 V. PARRINGTON, supra note 32, at xxvii (rival visions of politics, originally instantiated
as Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism, both underwent subtle changes due to demands of practical
politics).
37. I have referred to this as an "imaginary" debate, although something like this did in fact
happen to Jefferson's party in the 1820's, a split that led to the eventual replacement of the Federalist
and Republican Parties with two branches of the Republican Party-the National Republicans and
the Democratic Republicans. S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBERG, A CONCISE HIS-
TORY OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 183-85 (2d ed. 1983). However, the political situation in the
years from 1805 to 1824 is very complicated, and cannot be reduced to a debate over Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian principles-for example, this perspective does not take into account the alliances formed
and broken because of the issue of slavery. In order to make my point about nested oppositions more
clear, I have framed my discussion in terms of a hypothetical debate over a limited number of issues,
which is nevertheless confirmed by historical examples.
38. Cf. 3 V. PARRINGTON, supra note 32, at xxviii (Jeffersonian principles of democracy have
been made to serve many different masters, and through this process their true meaning has been "lost
out of the reckoning," except in fringe radical and third party movements).
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on the other. In each case, no matter which side prevails in calling its
principles the "true" version of Jeffersonianism, the original struggle be-
tween Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism has been recapitulated at a
different level. The opposition is nested no matter in which direction his-
tory moves, because a version of the thematic opposite is involved in the
struggle over the meaning of the cultural theme.
An analogous phenomenon arises when historians or other theorists at-
tempt to give concrete meaning to theoretical terms like "Jeffersonianism"
or "individualism." This is not like a debate among Lutherans as to what
Lutheranism consists in, but rather a definitional debate about a theoreti-
cal term or ideal type that will be used in theoretical discussion. Yet be-
cause the concept of Jeffersonianism depends upon a conceptual opposi-
tion that arises in a particular context, its contours are not fully defined in
all other contexts. The moment that we start to fix the contours of the
concept in new contexts, we will note that its opposite has made an ap-
pearance "within" the concept. The nested nature of the opposition be-
tween Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism will reassert itself as we at-
tempt to flesh out the meaning of either cultural theme.
Imagine a dispute about what the Jeffersonian position on a national
progressive income tax might be. Someone might argue that Jeffersonian-
ism is inconsistent with a progressive income tax, because Jefferson him-
self believed in the sanctity of private property,3" while someone else
might argue that as an egalitarian measure, such a tax is clearly in the
spirit of Jeffersonianism. 40 We cannot solve this controversy by saying
that Jeffersonianism is always the more egalitarian position,41 unless we
wish to say that Jeffersonianism is simply a synonym for egalitarianism.
(At that point we would begin a further debate over the theoretical term
"egalitarianism," and the difficulties would begin anew.) Suppose that we
decide that the progressive income tax, although more egalitarian than its
opposite, is nevertheless inconsistent with Jeffersonianism. If we focus on
the reasons why we think that the line separating Jeffersonianism from
other forms of egalitarianism has to be drawn at the progressive income
39. For example, in a 1816 letter Jefferson wrote that redistribution should not be pursued too
aggressively, because "the first principle of association [is] 'the guarantee to everyone [of] a free exer-
cise of his industry and the fruits acquired by it.'" R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 27, at 47-48 (em-
phasis in original).
40. Cf Cincone, Land Reform and Corporate Redistribution: The Republican Legacy, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 1229, 1232-35 (1987) (arguing that Republicanism and Jeffersonianism viewed government
as existing not so much to protect property as to promote equal access to property); M. PETERSON,
supra note 31, at 355-76 (arguing that New Deal appropriated Jefferson as symbol of
egalitarianism).
41. Cf. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 35, at 57-58 (noting increasing divergence between western
Jeffersonians, who saw democracy as best served by emphasizing decentralization and states' rights,
and eastern Jeffersonians, who emphasized economic equality); id. at 510-18 (anti-statist element of
Jeffersonian philosophy came into conflict with egalitarian element as it became clear that stronger
state was necessary to reign in increasing concentrations of private power, and to check. ambitions of
business interests).
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tax, we may discover that these reasons recapitulate some of the themes of
Hamiltonianism-for example, that respect for individual autonomy can
only be achieved by recognizing and rewarding individual differences in
talent and ambition."2 We now see that our concretized conception of Jef-
fersonianism has a little Hamiltonianism in it, even though we originally
defined the two cultural themes by their opposition. Of course, we may
decide the other way in this case. We may decide that the progressive
income tax is consistent with Jeffersonianism. But even in that case, the
debate over the contours of what Jeffersonianism means will call up in an
uncanny way the original debate between Jeffersonianism and its oppo-
site."3 And at some point-when we begin to consider the issue of national
health insurance or a theory of comparable worth-we will begin to see
the Hamiltonian aspects emergent in our concept of Jeffersonianism.""
The opposition between Jefferson's and Hamilton's political philoso-
phies might be nested in still another way. Perhaps similarities between
the two philosophies will emerge as history progresses-we witness Jef-
ferson and his followers taking positions more like those of Hamilton and
his followers as time goes on. Or imagine that as a result of a generation
of Jeffersonian political reforms, a reaction is produced which results in a
strongly Hamiltonian politics. In this version of the nested opposition, one
term produces its opposite or comes to resemble its opposite.45 This last
version of nested opposition sounds vaguely like Hegel's theory of history,
and the resemblance is not accidental-it is one of the debts that decon-
structive argument owes to Hegelianism. 6
42. This view is the converse of the Jeffersonian principle that every person should have an equal
opportunity to become an independent proprietor who could provide for his or her wants or needs
through the exercise of his or her own labor. The Hamiltonian element emerges as the Jeffersonian
principle is applied to defend the interests of the profit-maximizing captain of industry.
43. This recapitulation will occur in two senses. On the one hand, the arguments for the tax being
Jeffersonian will recapitulate the egalitarian strain of Jeffersonian thought in opposition to the
Hamiltonian. On the other hand, the argument that the Federal government has the power to levy
such a tax rests upon a conception of stronger national powers that is unmistakably Hamiltonian.
Indeed, one of the "Hamiltonian" elements of Jefferson's own thought was his increasing recogni-
tion-during the years of his presidency and afterward-that increased national power was necessary
to achieve his other political goals. Thus, the conflict about the meaning of Jeffersonianism is a con-
flict between two different notions of Jeffersonianism-the decentralization aspect versus the egalita-
rian aspect-each of which in turn has its own "Jeffersonian" and "Hamiltonian" elements.
44. We will see this both with respect to debates about the meaning of equality of opportunity
and with respect to debates about the appropriate degree of government intervention.
45. In the case of Jeffersonianism, changing historical circumstances split the egalitarian compo-
nent of Jeffersonianism from its anti-statist and pro-decentralization component as the need to check
private power, and especially the power of business interests, increasingly called for a stronger na-
tional regulatory apparatus. Opposition to slavery on egalitarian grounds (or on the less altruistic
grounds that the spread of slavery would drive down the wages of the ordinary white working man)
also conflicted with a states' rights position. The confrontation between the two strains of thought
came to a head both during the Civil War and the New Deal. Thus both the states' rights advocates
who abandoned economic and social egalitarianism, and the economic and social egalitarians who
abandoned states' rights, could claim that they were the true heirs of Jefferson, even though each
group's philosophy actually became a little more like Hamilton's as history progressed.
46. T.K. Seung has offered an interpretation of Hegel along these lines. See T. SEUNG, SEMIO-
TICS AND THEMATICS IN HERMENEUTICS 199-203 (1982) (interpreting Hegelian dialectic as clash of
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B. Nested Oppositions in Legal Doctrine
The dialectic of Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism is a good example
of the nested opposition of cultural themes, but one might nevertheless
object that this example relies too much on the paradoxical nature of indi-
vidual human personalities. Consider now an example taken from tort
law-the choice between negligence and strict liability. We are all famil-
iar with the opposition between the two principles of liability represented
by these rules-the fault principle and the compensation principle-and
the constant struggle between these principles in the law of accidents. In-
deed, Harry Kalven once said that negligence and strict liability "cannot
be made to sleep together except by fiat. The history of tort law has been
made up out of the tension between the two principles."4
In one sense, Kalven was surely right. Negligence does appear to be the
opposite of strict liability. On the other hand, if we look closely at the law
of negligence, we will see subdoctrines that can only be justified by the
same sorts of arguments that one uses to justify strict liability. Such exam-
ples include the use of objective standards for determining fault, the adult
activity rule for children, res ipsa loquitur, negligence per se, and the rule
that in measuring damages the defendant takes the plaintiff as she finds
her.4 If we look at the doctrines of strict liability, we will similarly find
pockets of negligence-that is to say, we will find doctrines that make
demonstrations of the defendant's fault or culpability essential to liability.
For example, in strict products liability one must still show a defect in
design or construction (and in some jurisdictions there is a state of the art
defense); causation in strict liability torts still requires that the defendant
could have foreseen the plaintiff's injury; extrasensitive plaintiffs cannot
recover for injuries cased by ultrahazardous activities if an ordinary plain-
tiff would not have been injured by the activity, and so on. From a still
broader perspective, we might note that existing doctrines of negligence
and strict liability are both inconsistent with a position that no duty is
opposing cultural themes which nevertheless depend upon and are transformed into different versions
of each other).
47. Kalven, Tort Law-Tort Watch, 34 J. AM. TRIAL L. 1, 43 (1972).
48. For example, an objective standard of negligence holds some persons liable even if they did not
understand their conduct was unreasonable and even if they could not have met the standard of rea-
sonableness. See, e.g., Jolley v. Powell, 299 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1974) (defending general rule that per-
manently insane persons are held to standard of reasonable person on grounds that it compensates
injured victims, creates additional deterrence, and is easier to apply than an individuated inquiry into
insanity). Similarly, the adult activity rule holds children engaging in adult activities to the standard
of adults even if the child could not reasonably be expected to achieve that standard of care; the rule
that the defendant takes the plaintiff as she finds her allows recovery of damages that were not fore-
seeable from defendant's standpoint even if a risk of some harm was foreseeable. For a fuller discus-
sion of the pockets of strict liability in negligence doctrine, see Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of
Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Balkin, Crystalline Structure]; Balkin,
Taking Ideology Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 55 U. Mo. KANSAS CrrY L.
REV. 392, 409-15 (1987) [hereinafter Balkin, Taking Ideology Seriously].
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owed at all to injured parties, or a position of absolute liability regardless
of causal responsibility.
It is very important to understand that this is not a claim that negli-
gence is strict liability, anymore than our earlier discussion claimed that a
moderate form of Jeffersonianism is Hamiltonianism. In a nested opposi-
tion, the opposed terms bear a relation of similarity but not identity to
each other. The similarity in this case is a similarity of the principles
which justify one rule (strict liability) and the subdoctrines which form
part of the opposite rule (negligence). To see this recapitulation is not to
defy logic, but rather to identify recurrent thematic elements of one within
what is nominally its opposite, elements which emerge as the context in
which the opposition is considered changes.
One might object that the nested opposition between negligence and
strict liability is contingent in the sense that it happens to be the case that
most jurisdictions have an objective standard of negligence. Some jurisdic-
tions have a state of the art defense in products liability, while others do
not. Perhaps in a different jurisdiction the forms of nestedness I have
identified would not appear at all. However, this opposition is nested in a
more important way. The arguments used to justify the choice between
negligence and strict liability reappear whenever we consider subrule
choices that flesh out the meaning of the concepts of negligence and strict
liability. For example, one principle which supports strict liability is that
one should be compensated for injuries caused by another; the correspond-
ing principle supporting negligence is that one should not be held liable
without fault. The debate between these principles is replicated within
each debate over the content of negligence and strict liability doctrine.
Thus, the argument for a state of the art defense to strict products liability
is that the manufacturer should not be held responsible for defects that
could not have been prevented even by the use of state of the art technol-
ogy; the argument against the defense is that one should be compensated
for injuries caused by a product even if the manufacturer could not pre-
vent them by exercising due care. The argument against the adult activity
rule in negligence law is that children who perform adult activities should
still be held to the lesser standard of children because they still cannot
conform their actions to those of a reasonable adult; the argument for the
adult activity rule is that children should be held to the adult standard
because the plaintiff has been no less injured even though the child could
not conform to that standard. No matter which way a particular jurisdic-
tion holds on these issues, the original debate over negligence and strict
liability is recapitulated in each decision. I call this phenomenon of recur-
ring forms of argument in the development of legal doctrine a "crystalline
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structure," because certain forms of crystals manifest identical internal
structures when viewed at macro and micro levels.49
Where the meaning or content of the terms of a conceptual opposition is
in flux, or not fully determined, it is possible to discover within each term
possible versions or interpretations of that term that bear similarities to
the principles associated with the opposite term. Since legal, ethical, and
political concepts have this contestable and incomplete character, it is often
possible to discover traces of their opposites in disputes over their meaning
and interpretation.
50
This phenomenon is partly explained by the differences between logical
contradiction and conceptual opposition. When we accept the truth of the
proposition P, we thereby also accept the falsity of the proposition not-P.
We therefore think it ridiculous that not-P could be used as a justification
in our subsequent arguments. This exclusivity, however, does not necessa-
rily hold true of conceptual oppositions, especially when the oppositions
involve questions of value. When we accept a negligence standard over
strict liability on the grounds that people should not be held liable without
fault, we have not foreclosed for all time the argument that a person who
causes harm to another should be held liable, even though these two pro-
positions seem to be opposed in the context of the choice between negli-
gence and strict liability. This is because the principle that persons should
not be held liable without fault does not have a completely definite scope
of application. Whereas the logical value (true or false) given to the pro-
position P always simultaneously determines the logical value to be given
to the proposition not-P, the acceptance of the ethical proposition "No
Liability Without Fault" does not determine the moral status in all cases
49. Balkin, Crystalline Structure, supra note 48, at 36-40. My study of recurring forms of legal
argument builds on earlier work by Duncan Kennedy. See Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motitves in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bar-
gaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1981); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudi-
cation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976). Very appropriately, Kennedy calls this phenomenon "nest-
ing." Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, in 3 LAw & SEsmo'Ncs (B. Kevelson ed. forthcoming
1990). We can view this phenomenon in two different ways. First, we can look at it semantically, as
we did in the case of the philosophies of Jeffersonianism and Hamiltonianism. We are trying to work
out what the concept of negligence means as a concept. In choosing between different possible inter-
pretations we find ourselves recapitulating the original debate between negligence and strict liability.
Second, we can look at the phenomenon pragmatically. We are not trying to define the word negli-
gence, because we realize that there are many possible regimes of rules that might collectively be
termed negligence doctrine. We are simply trying to choose subdoctrinal rules that best serve society's
needs or otherwise seem most just. In creating a system of negligence rules and subrules we will find
ourselves recapitulating our original policy arguments about the choice between negligence and strict
liability at a more discrete level. Legal debate about rules and the application of rules to facts is often
both semantic and pragmatic at the same time. For example, we may see the adult activity rule as
merely a subdoctrine of negligence, and not analytically required by the word "negligence." Yet we
may be interested in whether operating a snowmobile is an adult activity. Similarly, we may think
that the question whether the reasonable person standard takes into account certain mental or physical
attributes is a matter of the best rule under the circumstances, or we may view it as an inquiry into
what reasonableness means in that context.
50. Again, since what is "the opposite" concept depends upon context, one can find the traces of
more radical alternatives as well as more moderate ones.
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of the opposite proposition that "One Who Causes Harm Should Pay" (a
proposition whose scope is equally indefinite). The proposition rejected in
one context may yet live to fight another day. Indeed, because it is never
fully eliminated, it remains relevant to the struggle over the meaning of
the concept of "fault" within its opposite number. Of course, this is not
true of logical contradictions. One cannot argue that terms in the true
proposition P mean such and such because not-P is true. However, one
can argue that the standard of negligence should be that of a reasonable
person because a person injured by the defendant is no less harmed and
no less deserying of compensation because the defendant who caused her
harm sincerely though unreasonably believed that she was acting
prudently.5
The impossibility of fully eliminating certain ethical or political princi-
ples from legal discourse leads to a well-known phenomenon in legal ar-
gument. When we present the same case to judges of different political
and ethical persuasions, they are often able to see very different principles
emanating from existing bodies of doctrine. As a result both judges can
sincerely believe that the best interpretation of existing legal materials
produces opposite results in the case before them. For example, in a juris-
diction in which a state of the art defense is proposed by one of the liti-
gants, one judge might note correctly that cases have held that the defend-
ant is not an insurer of the plaintiff's safety under all circumstances, that
products liability requires a showing of defect, and that one cannot justly
be blamed for placing a defective product on the market if it was con-
structed according to the state of the art. Another judge might note,
equally correctly, that the jurisdiction's acceptance of the doctrine of strict
products liability is acceptance of the principle that compensation will b,.
awarded regardless of defendant's moral blameworthiness, that a product
is no less dangerous because it was constructed according to the state of
the art, and that the plaintiff harmed by such a product is no less deserv-
ing of compensation. Even though the case must be decided one way or
the other, both judges could sincerely believe that their interpretation of
the principles behind existing legal materials was the best one. Moreover,
even if the court holds that there is a state of the art defense in the rele-
vant jurisdiction, new disputes will arise concerning the interpretation of
the defense, and different judges may again find within the same materials
reasons for opposing interpretations. Again, the reason why this occurs is
not because one of the judges or the other is unwittingly involved in logi-
51. For a philosophical argument along the same lines, see T. Seung & D. Bonevac, Constrained
Indeterminacy (1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). For the classic legal argument
for objective standards in tort law, see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 85-89 (M. Howe ed.
1963).
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cal contradiction. It is because legal doctrines and distinctions invariably
involve conceptual oppositions that are also nested oppositions.52
C. Nested Oppositions in Critical Scholarship
Many of the arguments made by feminists and by members of the Crit-
ical Legal Studies movement rely upon demonstrating a nested opposition
between legal concepts traditionally thought separate and distinct. For ex-
ample, one of the most famous and well known of these arguments decon-
structs the distinction between public power and private power. Such ar-
guments are often misunderstood, both by those persons criticizing them
and also by those making them. The problem arises from a confusion of
similarity with identity, or a confusion of a claim of nested opposition
with a claim that there is no opposition at all.
The deconstruction of the conceptual opposition between public and
private power, for example, is easily confused with the claim that there is
no difference between public and private power, or that private power is
public power, or vice versa. Such uncompromising statements might have
limited value as a useful shorthand, or as a corrective to a tendency to
overemphasize the differences between the two terms, but they are not
accurate, because one can further deconstruct them to make the distinction
between public and private reappear. Public and private form a nested
opposition, which means that they are similar in some respects while dif-
ferent in others, and that they have a mutual conceptual dependence even
though they are nominally differentiated.
To cast out the public/private distinction therefore involves its own
form of nested opposition, which subordinates analyses that recognize the
distinction to those that do not. Yet it should be obvious that as soon as
one tries to articulate any policy judgment based upon the abolition of the
public/private distinction, one will reinscribe it in another form. For ex-
ample, suppose that we argue that the state has a duty to prohibit private
acts of racial and religious discrimination. Because the government pro-
tects its citizens from other economic and social harms produced by indi-
vidual choice (for example, through minimum wage legislation), the gov-
ernment's failure to protect individuals from racial and religious
discrimination is a value-laden regulatory choice for which the state is
ultimately responsible. Suppose we then consider whether the state has a
duty to create a civil action for persons who were spurned by a prospec-
tive spouse or lover because of racial or religious differences. We might
well decide that the government is not responsible for such acts of discrim-
ination, because the selection of one's spouse or lover is a matter of indi-
vidual choice with which the government should not interfere. Yet at this
52. For further discussion of this point, see Balkin, Taking Ideology Seriously, supra note 48.
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point our justification has simply restated the public/private distinction in
a new form.5"
The lesson to draw from this example is that arguments based upon the
reinterpretation of a conceptual opposition as a nested opposition must be
made sensitively and carefully lest they create misunderstanding. They
must not be confused with claims of false opposition or identity.54
A second point concerning CLS and feminist arguments which rely
upon nested oppositions is that such arguments are occasionally claimed to
exemplify or emanate from a countervision which is opposed to the domi-
nant vision enforced by the law. Yet at the same time the critical or femi-
nist scholar may claim that the countervision is exemplified by particular
doctrines or policy considerations already found in the law itself, or found
in modified form.55 No doubt this way of talking leads to considerable
confusion. How can something be at one and the same time representative
of a revolutionary countervision and a generalization of the status quo?
The answer is supplied by understanding the critique in terms of a nested
opposition. The new vision of legal practice is opposed to the traditional
vision. Yet, in fact, each vision contains a little of the other. The critical or
feminist scholar locates this point of similarity in marginal or exceptional
doctrines within the status quo, and attempts to expand their influence
until they become the paradigmatic examples of how problems of regula-
tion should be approached. For example, constitutional law recognizes a
relatively strict division between public and private action. Nevertheless, a
few cases like Shelley v. Kraener56 deal with exceptional situations or
53. We could continue by deconstructing this argument. The claim that the government should
not interfere with one's choice of spouse or lover is problematic because the government is always
doing this by the content of its legal regulations and non-regulations. The failure of the government to
proscribe racial and religious discrimination in the choice of spouses and lovers when it does proscribe
such discrimination in the area of employment can be said to be a governmental choice that does affect
the conditions under which people choose their spouses and lovers. The same can be said for the
government's failure or choice to pursue educational programs in the public schools to break down
traditional barriers and prejudices against interracial or interfaith marriages. One can see that the
collapse, reseparation, and recollapse of the public/private distinction could go on indefinitely. Indeed,
this is one of the characteristic features of a nested opposition.
54. Similarly, radical feminist critiques of rape law, see, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, TOWARDS A FEM-
INIST THEORY OF THE STATE 171-83 (1989), which point out that both rape and normal heterosex-
ual relations may involve coercion of females by males, and the legal realist critique of laissez-faire
contract doctrine, which argues that both duress and "normal" contractual relations involve forms of
coercion between the parties, see Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. SCi. Q. 470 (1923), are best expressed as claims of nested opposition, and not as claims
of false opposition or identity.
55. Cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685
(1976) (doctrine of good faith performance as limited representation of altruist conception of social
life); Minow,Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 14-16, 58-61, 71-74 (1987) (noting that
sporadic attempts by Supreme Court Justices to view constitutional questions from perspective of
different groups are examples of alternative approach to questions of difference); Unger, The Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1983) (deviationist doctrine proceeds by expansion
of exceptional case into mainstream doctrine).
56. 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948) (holding that enforcement of private racially discriminatory cove-
nant constituted state action).
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specially demarcated areas in which the general rules do not seem to work
well. The critic's goal, then, is to expand the principles underlying the
unusual or special cases until they begin to swallow up some of the para-
digmatic situations in which the usual rules are thought to apply. One can
then speak of the expanded doctrine as symbolizing a countervision, which
is immanent in existing doctrine, yet suppressed or marginalized."
This sort of analysis leads to an obvious question: What value is there
in postulating a countervision of politics or law, when the results one is
arguing for could be achieved through manipulation of marginal areas of
existing doctrine? The answer is that once the logic of a nested opposition
is grasped, one can see that these are really two different ways of describ-
ing the same phenomena. It is really a matter of how one wishes to talk
about it. Often it makes more sense to emphasize that the countervision
one proposes is always immanent in the vision one is critiquing. On the
other hand, one might wish to downplay similarity to the extent that one
wants to emphasize the distance between politics and legal doctrine as one
currently sees them, and politics and doctrine as they would become if the
marginalized or suppressed principles were expanded or recognized. But
whichever way a critical or feminist scholar expresses such insights, both
she and her audience should understand that the logical basis of the argu-
ment is not logical contradiction or denial but the elaboration of a nested
opposition within politics and legal doctrine.
II. THE NESTED OPPOSITION OF SPEECH AND WRITING
Our previous discussion of nested oppositions has shown how concep-
tual oppositions-of cultural themes like Jeffersonianism and Hamiltoni-
anism, of legal doctrines like negligence and strict liability, and of political
concepts like public and private-behave according to a deconstructive
logic. The poles of each conceptual opposition have a simultaneous rela-
tionship of differentiation and dependence. Ellis' major mistake through-
out Against Deco nstruction is failing to recognize this relationship be-
tween conceptual opposition and nested opposition, and thus the
important differences between nested opposition and false opposition. Be-
cause, as explained above, almost all deconstructive arguments can be un-
derstood to depend upon some form of nested opposition, it is clear that
much of what Ellis has to say about deconstruction is affected by this flaw
in his analysis.
A good example is Ellis's critique of Derrida's claim in Of Gram-
matology that Western thought has privileged speech over writing.5" To
begin with, Ellis misunderstands the claim that Derrida is making. Be-
57. In rough form, this is the method of deviationist doctrine espoused by Roberto Unger in
Unger, supra note 55, at 577-83.
58. J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 3 (1976).
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cause Derrida uses the term "ethnocentrism" to describe the Western
preference for speech, Ellis assumes that Derrida is making a political
claim-that Western cultures improperly look down on or ignore primi-
tive societies. Ellis argues that an ethnocentric approach would tend to
valorize or emphasize things Westerners have (such as writing) that more
primitive cultures lack. Thus, the ethnocentrism of Western linguists, for
example, involved focusing exclusively on "cultures and languages with
long written traditions." 9 Ellis points out that this is very hard to square
with Derrida's claim that Western thought debases writing.
Derrida's claim of ethnocentrism, however, is much more subtle than
Ellis's version. Derrida argues that Western civilization's attitude towards
writing reflects a more general approach towards issues of truth and rep-
resentation that has not been universally shared in all cultures. The West-
ern tradition, Derrida argues, sees writing as a representation of a repre-
sentation, and speech as something closer to or more directly
representational of reality."0
Thus, in Of Grammatology, Derrida is not concerned with whether lin-
guists examined written languages more than spoken ones, or whether
Western cultures looked down on illiterate societies. Rather, he is inter-
ested in the rhetoric that Western thinkers have used when describing the
relationship of speech and writing to reality. Derrida gives dozens of ex-
amples of rhetoric by Western figures from Plato to Saussure which indi-
cate that for them speech is much closer to truth, or to what the speaker
means, or to reality itself, than is writing. Thus, Derrida notes "the Aris-
totelian definition . . . [that] '[sipoken words are the symbols of mental
experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words.' "61 The
Western "ethnocentrism" of which Derrida speaks is the recurrent theme
in Western thought that the very writing which distinguishes Western civ-
ilization from more "primitive" cultures is nevertheless viewed by Wes-
terners as an abstraction from, and an imperfect representation of, speech.
Speech, on the other hand, is seen as the true reflection of reality, or the
speaker's actual present meaning. Thus, even though Western thinkers
might have seen writing as evidence of their superiority, the semiotic
59. P. 19.
60. The difference among cultures on this issue may stem from the fact that many cultures used
written hieroglyphics or picture symbols, which might arguably have a more direct resemblance to
reality than spoken words. For example, a picture symbol of a bird might seem to represent a bird
more closely than the phonetic sounds of the word for "bird" in a particular spoken language. But
since Western thought no longer has a tradition of hieroglyphic writing, and now views such hierog-
lyphics as odd or impractical, see J. DERRIDA, supra note 58, at 3, 24-26 (discussing Hegel's ambiva-
lence toward Chinese hieroglyphics and his preference for Western alphabets), it cannot imagine writ-
ing as being more direct a representation of reality than speech. A careful reading of Derrida reveals
this to be his point, and it is confirmed by the cover of Of Grainmatology itself, which is a picture of
hieroglyphic writing-that is, the kind of writing that is thought to be more directly representational
than speech.
61. Id. at 30.
[Vol. 99: 16691690
Nested Oppositions
properties of writing always disturbed them. Writing is debased as mere
representation of truth, reality, or present meaning, as if something other
than representation were available, or could be sought after. That thing,
Derrida argues, is a form of "presence"-of direct, unmediated experience
with what really is.62
Because Ellis misunderstands the claim Derrida is making, he also fails
to give a correct account of Derrida's key argument in Of Grammatology
that writing is prior to speech. Ellis claims that there are obvious "logi-
cal" problems with Derrida's position.63 Yet the "logical" problems Ellis
identifies are really assertions that Derrida is empirically wrong about the
priority of writing over speech. Ellis points out that speech existed long
before the invention of writing, that there still exist languages in the
world that are spoken but not written, that many people can speak but
not write a language, and so on.64
At this point Ellis feigns bewilderment-"[g]iven the fact that most of
this is obvious," he asks, "what is Derrida's argument trying to do, and
why does he not explain the fact that (presumably, in his view) none of
these points are relevant to it?"65 But since these facts are obvious, it does
not take very much effort to see that Derrida cannot mean "prior" in the
sense of historical or numerical priority. He means that writing is concep-
tually or ontologically prior to speech-that speech is already a kind of
writing. Just as one might say of a political figure that she is a closet
conservative or a closet liberal, Derrida is arguing that speech is a type of
"closet" writing-that it already shares all of the characteristics of writing
for which Western thinkers have debased writing and elevated speech.
Derrida's argument is that speech and writing form a nested opposition.
When Western thinkers oppose speech to writing they imagine properties
in which the two are thought to differ. Speech is viewed as being more
direct a presentation of meaning or truth, more present to consciousness.
Writing is seen as more indirect and representational, more mediated,
more of an interposition between reality and the observer-in short, writ-
62. This interpretation of Derrida also explains Derrida's statement that the Swiss linguist, Fer-
dinand de Saussure, continued the ethnocentrism of the West. Ellis is mystified by this claim because
"Saussure's importance was to turn linguistics away from this prevailing ethnocentric concern with
the written and toward the spoken languages of that part of the world outside the Western tradition."
P. 20 (emphasis in original). However, Derrida is concerned with the ethnocentric assumption that
writing is only an imperfect representation of a truer meaning that is given by speech. Saussure's very
concern with spoken language (which Ellis thinks makes him less ethnocentric) is based upon Saus-
sure's view that
Writing, though unrelated to [the] inner system [of language], is used continually to re-
present language .... We must be acquainted with its usefulness, shortcomings, and dangers.
Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole pur-
pose of representing thefirst. . . .[Tlhe spoken forms alone constitute the [linguistic] object.
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ing appears more "sign-like" than speech. But the nested opposition be-
tween writing and speech means that from another context we can see
that speech already has these "written" characteristics. Speech is also only
a set of signifiers; speech can be just as misleading or just as indirect a
representation of the world as writing. Indeed, if we focus on the proper-
ties in the speech/writing opposition that we assigned to "written-
ness"-being sign-like, mediating, indirect, representational-we will see
that speech has all of these properties. Indeed, these are all properties of
semiosis-of being a signifier standing for or representing a signified.
Thus, speech and writing are both special cases of a more generalized
form of "writing," that is, semiosis.
Ellis is dissatisfied with this argument because, at the end of it, the
word "writing" means something different from the "writing" that was
opposed to speech. 6 At the beginning of the argument "[w]e begin with
three terms: language, speech, and writing. The first contains the second
and third.167  At the end of the argument we have a second
triad-writing-in-general, phonic writing (speech), and graphic writing
("writing" proper).68 But, claims Ellis, the nature of writing has not
changed. We have simply redefined our terms-we have not proven that
speech is a form of writing. He calls this "a very well known logical mis-
take," and a "misuse of English."6
Of course, Derrida is not trying to do anything illegitimate by his re-
definition. He is simply making use of the properties and logic of a nested
opposition. Starting with the opposition of speech and writing, he notes
what their difference is thought to consist in. Derrida calls the purport-
edly differential properties of writing-as-opposed-to-speech "writ-
ing"-they are the "written" features of writing in its traditional opposi-
tion to speech. Yet it turns out (and this is Derrida's point) that these
features are features of all semiotic representation-of being a sign that
stands for something else. This is because Western thought has suppressed
the semiotic (sign-like) characteristics of speech and projected them onto,
or identified them with, written language. Thus, when Derrida says writ-
ing is prior to speech, he means that those properties of writing that have
traditionally been thought to distinguish it from speech-the semiotic
characteristics of writing-are those properties that also allow speech to
function, because speech is nothing more than a different form of repre-
sentation, and therefore must function as all other signs do in order to
signify. When Derrida talks about the general form of "writing" at the
end of the argument, therefore, he means "semiotic representation" (not
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it, "arche-writing") is now being used to stand for the (purportedly) dif-
ferential properties of writing as opposed to speech.
This way of talking is admittedly metaphorical, and, as Ellis notes,
Derrida often reverts to the previous meaning of "writing" in later
passages in Of Grammatology.70 However, because Ellis reads Derrida's
texts in a relentlessly literal manner, he does not see the importance of
"writing-as-opposed-to-speech" as a general metaphor for the distance be-
tween signs and what they stand for, or as a metaphor for a general dis-
tinction between what is merely representational and what is directly
comprehended or experienced. This distinction is central to Western
thought, which seeks to go past mere representation, and approach (to the
degree humanly possible) things-as-they-really-are. Thus, Ellis does not
understand Derrida's claim that the continuing acceptance of the superior-
ity of speech over writing is a special case of a more general approach to
philosophical problems. He states bluntly that "this entire fallacious argu-
ment about the priority of speech and language is found to be unnecessary
for the main course of his thought: It could be dropped without loss. ' 71
Yet it is precisely Derrida's point to show that the way that Western
thinkers have conceptualized the virtues and vices of writing replicates the
characteristic moves of Western metaphysics, moves that he collectively
refers to by the term "logocentrism."
III. LOGOCENTRISM AND ESSENTIALISM
Ellis has done us a great service by noting the connection between Der-
rida's "logocentrism" and previous theories of language. 2 Ellis identifies
logocentrism with the philosophical position known as essentialism, which
he describes as "the belief that words simply label real categories of mean-
ing existing independently of a language. ' 73 Ellis has criticized essential-
ism in his own writing, basing his attacks upon the earlier work of Lud-
wig Wittgenstein.74  Yet Ellis is mistaken that Derrida's target,
70. P. 25 & n.12.
71. P. 27.
72. Pp. 35-37.
73. P. 35. Essentialism is usually thought to be opposed to the philosophical position of nominal-
ism, which argues that meanings are a product of conventions, rather than pointing to preexisting
essences of things already in the world. There are, in fact, many different versions of both views, and
confusion of the different versions is quite common. For a modern discussion of essentialism and
nominalism, and related theories concerning universals and particulars, see D. ARMSTRONG, UNIVER-
SALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION (1989); B. BLANSHARD, REASON AND ANALYSIS (1962).
Ellis also associates logocentrism with what he calls a "referential" theory of language-which argues
that "language simply refers to things in the world and labels them." P. 37. Ellis thus appears to
conflate essentialism with a referential theory of language; nevertheless, the two philosophical posi-
tions are distinct. A nominalist who believes that what we call a "cat" is not determined by reference
to a preexisting essence of "catness," but is only a matter of linguistic convention, might still adhere to
what Ellis calls a "referential" theory of language. The nominalist might hold that the word "cat"
points or refers to those things that fall under the governing linguistic convention.
74. J. ELLIS, supra note 3, at 12-16; Ellis, supra note 4, at 441-42.
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logocentrism, is nothing more than essentialism. This mistake colors the
entire analysis that follows, leading him to make a number of misleading
accusations against Derrida.
Ellis points out that if logocentrism is essentialism, many philosophers
have attacked it previously, and Derrida would simply be the last in a
long line.75 Indeed, Ellis remarks, essentialism is a "view of meaning that
by now would have to be considered a very naive and uninformed one."176
As a result, Ellis concludes that Derrida's unclear descriptions of logocen-
trism must be part of a deliberate ruse or a form of intellectual dishonesty,
for "if the logocentric error were stated in any clearer way it would be far
too obviously an unoriginal discovery."
77
Ellis' interpretation of Derrida is a particularly good example of the
sort of unfortunate misunderstandings produced by the historical separa-
tion of the Anglo-American and Continental traditions of philosophy. El-
lis, who is very much influenced by Wittgenstein and ordinary language
philosophy, naturally assumes that what Derrida must be concerned with
is a familiar problem on the agenda of American and British philosophy.
In fact, Derrida's attack on "logocentrism" speaks to a different set of
concerns within the Continental tradition.
Although I am somewhat disturbed by the recurrently patronizing atti-
tude of Ellis towards Continental philosophy in general and Derrida in
particular, 8 I believe that this particular misunderstanding of the term
"logocentrism" is not wholly Ellis' fault. Derrida's prose is often simply
quite unclear. Ellis is not the first person to assume that logocentrism is
identical to essentialism, 79 although I believe that a careful reading of
75. P. 37.
76. P. 38. I should note in passing that not all persons agree with Ellis' assessment of the naivete
of essentialism. See, e.g., Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?,
41 STAN. L. REv. 871, 879 (1989) (defending essentialism and related position of "full-blooded"
metaphysical realism). Thus, it is important to understand that when Ellis criticizes Derrida, he is
speaking from the perspective of a devoted Wittgensteinian, and thus may not speak for the present
scholarly consensus as to the status of essentialism, either in literary theory, philosophy, or law.
77. P. 37. Ellis points out that the essentialist view of language "has been dismembered in various
ways, with varying emphases, by analytic philosophers such as Wittgenstein . . . by linguists such as
J.R. Firth, by anthropological linguists working in the tradition of Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee
Whorf, and by countless others." P. 38. Ellis blames Derrida's isolation from these thinkers on his
fixation with texts of thinkers in the Continental tradition of philosophy, "If]or Heidegger, Freud,
Nietzsche, and LEvi-Strauss. . . are nowhere near being central figures in the debate on this particu-
lar issue. . . . To mention such figures in this context only makes the absence of the many really
central figures who deal directly and in a major way with essentialist thinking all the more obvious."
P. 40.
78. See, e.g., p. 39 ("it [is] impossible for Derrida and his followers to see themselves as other
than, first and foremost, iconoclasts and liberators"); p. 40 (complaining that "Heidegger, Freud, and
LUvi-Strauss all had a most unskeptical attitude to the sanctity of their own terminological innovations
and the concepts they embodied"); pp. 43-44 (criticizing Derrida for not acknowledging Wittgen-
stein's work, implying that Derrida fails to do so because he wishes to be thought philosophically and
politically revolutionary, criticizing essentially "rhetorical and emotional stance" of deconstruction,
and arguing that Derrida's failure to cite Wittgenstein raises "unanswerable questions" which "cast a
considerable shadow on the value of Derrida's contribution").
79. See, e.g., pp. 35-36 (quoting Lentricchia, Jameson, and others).
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Derrida's work establishes that essentialism is merely a special case of
logocentrism.
"Logocentrism," as its name implies, is the centering of logos, a richly
evocative Greek word that means, among other things, "word," "reason,"
and "true account."8 The connections between all of these different con-
cepts resonate deeply in Western thought. For example, from logos we get
words such as "logic" (the laws of reason). Logos also connotes the Word
of God, divine unmediated truth and the truth of revelation, as in the
famous Biblical passage: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word
was with God ... ."81
Derrida sees all of Western philosophy as a search for logos-by which
he means the directly comprehensible and unmediated experience of truth,
of which Divine revelation is the most powerful example. Unmediatedness
and instantaneousness are very important to this conception, because if
one receives the Truth mediated by something, say, through the explana-
tions of a prophet, the prophet might have gotten it partly wrong, and if
one hears about it later on, one might get less than the whole experience.
The goal of philosophy (and of many other intellectual endeavors) is to
cut through illusion and disguise, mediation and deferral of What-Really-
Is, and come to know and experience The Real Thing. The characteristic
move of philosophy is to fasten upon some thing or concept X, and assert
that it is closer to The Real Thing than its opposite Y. Simultaneously one
asserts that Y is farther away, that Y somehow blocks or obscures direct
unmediated experience or understanding, while X does not, or does so to a
lesser degree. Thus, the act of philosophical distinction is the primordial
act of logocentrism.82 Moreover, the act of philosophical distinction is also,
it turns out, the creation of a conceptual opposition.
It should now be quite obvious what Derrida's next move is going to
be. He will argue that each conceptual opposition between X and Y is
actually a nested opposition. Thus each philosophical conception of The
Real Thing-whether it be Truth, Justice, or some other value-will ul-
timately bear a relation of similarity to or dependence upon that which it
subordinates or suppresses. It will turn out that X's claim to be closer to
the Real Thing than Y will be undercut by this reinterpretation of the
opposition of X and Y as a nested opposition. In sum, logocentrism as a
strategy will always fail because logocentrism always involves the creation
of a conceptual opposition that is already also a nested opposition."3
80. F. PETERS, GREEK PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS: A HISTORICAL LEXICON 110-12 (1967).
81. John 1:1.
82. Here one can trace the influence of Heidegger on Derrida's thought. Heidegger argues that
the original meaning of logos is "to put one thing with another, to bring together, in short, to gather;
but at the same time the one is marked off against the other." M. HEIDEGGER, AN INTRODUCTION
To METAPHYSICS 124 (1959). Thus, intellectual conception means simultaneously gathering certain
things together and distinguishing them from others.
83. I have always thought it helpful to think of Derrida as announcing a sort of "Murphy's Law"
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However, from this perspective, it should be clear that since there are
many different attitudes among philosophers about what The Real Thing
is, there are many different forms of logocentrism. Indeed, there are as
many different forms of logocentrism as there are versions of Western phi-
losophy. Plato's theory of Forms is obviously logocentric, for Plato tells us
that knowledge of the Forms is knowledge of what most truly is, whereas
sensory experience provides only a pale copy of the Truth. Yet the empiri-
cist who informs us that all knowledge comes from experience and the
logical positivist who insists that unverifiable statements are meaningless
also indulge in their own particular versions of logocentrism. One might
conclude from these examples that all Western philosophy is therefore
logocentric, and this is precisely the conclusion that Derrida reaches.
It follows that both essentialism and its opposite, nominalism or conven-
tionalism, involve forms of logocentrism. The essentialist argues that lan-
guage points to or refers to real entities which are the source of truth. The
nominalist, however, argues that established social conventions fix mean-
ing; the search for essences that words refer to obfuscates the real source
of meaning, which is linguistic convention. Because Ellis misinterprets
Derrida to mean by "logocentrism" something much more spe-
cific-namely, essentialism-he cannot understand what motivates Der-
rida's attacks on Saussure, who as Ellis correctly points out is surely one
of the most anti-essentialist thinkers of modern times.84
IV. THE CRITIQUE OF NOMINALISM AND LINGUISTIC
CONVENTIONALISM
Ellis' discussion of Saussure and Derrida is, although ultimately mis-
leading at key points, one of the best parts of the book, and one which is
most relevant to legal philosophy. Ellis wages his attack on Derrida
largely through a defense of Saussure's theories of language and meaning.
This is because, as Ellis himself points out, Derrida's own views of lan-
guage arise as an extension and partial critique of Saussure's theory."5
Ellis therefore takes it upon himself to expound and defend Saussure's
position, which, like Ellis' own, is nominalist or conventionalist. Ellis
wishes to refute Derrida's claim that Saussure's linguistic conventionalism
engages in the same logocentric error that Derrida attributes to other
Western thinkers. More importantly, however, Ellis seeks to show that
when Saussure's theories of language are correctly understood and ap-
plied, they offer no support for the claim that meaning is arbitrary in the
sense of being indeterminate.8 6 Thus, Ellis' defense of Saussure is his way
of Metaphysics-that whatever aspect of being a philosophical system casts out or neglects will prove
to be its undoing.
84. See p. 45.
85. See pp. 45, 52.
86. P. 51.
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of establishing that a nominalist or conventionalist theory of meaning is
fully consistent with (and indeed, even requires) semantic determinacy,
and therefore that deconstructionist claims about the fluidity of language
are misguided.
In order to understand the debate between Ellis and Derrida, one must
therefore understand Saussure's theory. Here Ellis does a good job of ex-
pounding Saussure's views. Saussure's key argument is that the relation-
ship between signifiers and signifieds is "arbitrary.""7 Ellis correctly notes
that by this Saussure meant two different things about the relationship
between language and reality. The first is the arbitrary relation between
the sound-image of words and the concept or thing that they signify.
Thus, when Shakespeare tells us "[t]hat which we call a rose/ By any
other name would smell as sweet," '88 he is making Saussure's first point
about the "arbitrary" relation between signifiers (here spoken words) and
signifieds (here concepts like rose).89 However, Ellis notes, Saussure made
a much more radical claim about the "arbitrary" relation between signi-
fier and signified. The concept rose itself "is an arbitrary creation of a
language and does not necessarily exist outside that language." 90 Lan-
guage divides up the world into various concepts, and "[d]ifferent lan-
guages group, organize, and even interpret them in different ways."91
Thus, Ellis argues in perfectly Saussurian fashion that
concepts [in a language] are not simple, positive terms that achieve
their meaning by corresponding to reality or to nonlinguistic facts;
instead, they achieve their meaning by the place they take within the
system of concepts of the language and, in particular, by their func-
tion in differentiating one category of things from another. It is the
system of differentiation, therefore, that is the source of meaning. 2
Ellis emphasizes, however, that Saussure does not mean by the "arbi-
trary" relationship of language to reality that language has no relation-
ship to reality. Words like warm and hot divide up the world into catego-
87. F. DE SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 67.




92. P. 46. Ellis gives as an example of Saussure's point the English words "warm" and "hot" and
the German words "warm" and "heiss":
[TJhe transition from the German word warm to heiss occurs very much further up the scale
than . . . the transition from warm to hot.. . . [Hfiesses Wasser is almost too hot . . . while
. . . hot water is hot enough. . . . An English speaker who learns the similar German words
without realizing that the two systems are different is likely to get hurt .... What, then, is
the concept warmness of water? It is a creation of the English language, a decision on its
speakers' part to group together and regard as equivalent for a certain purpose everything
from roughly 90 degrees to 115 degrees Fahrenheit. Water itself does not dictate such a choice,
but only the arbitrary system of [differences within] a given language.
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ries, but that is because Saussure thinks that there is already something
there to be divided up.
9 3
Moreover, Ellis argues that Saussure's theory of linguistic conventions
does not entail that individual speakers can mean anything they want by
their words. Thus, Ellis claims, Saussure's concept of linguistic arbitrari-
ness did not imply that meaning was indeterminate.
To the contrary: it is precisely the fact that the conceptual system of
English is the common property of its speakers (i.e., that all in a
sense agree to make the same arbitrary decision) that gives its words
any meaning at all. As Saussure himself puts it, "The word arbi-
trary . . . should not imply that the choice of the signifier is left
entirely to the speaker (we shall see below that the individual does
not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become
established in the linguistic community)," . . . Arbitrariness in this
sense, then, refers not to randomness but to the reverse, to the fact
that there is a definite agreement on the particular system of terms
to be used and on how they are to be used.94
From Ellis' discussion and defense of Saussure, it is easy to see how
Derrida concluded that Saussure had reinstituted a form of logocentrism
in his anti-essentialist theories of language. For Saussure, the boundaries
of linguistic concepts are not given by the world itself-the world will not
tell us where warm ends and hot begins. Rather, these boundaries must be
located in fixed linguistic conventions that we agree to use, or more cor-
rectly, that we are born into and use unconsciously and naturally. This
feeling of naturalness is precisely what leads to the delusion of essential-
ism-we mistakenly believe that language re-presents boundaries that are
already there in the world when we have collectively created them and
assimilated that knowledge as members of a linguistic community. Mean-
ing is located in linguistic conventions that are logically prior to, and con-
trol, the meaning of individual acts of meaning by individual speakers and
writers. This is the basis of Ellis' argument that an individual speaker
cannot simply decide to make a word mean whatever she wants it to
mean.
Nevertheless, because Saussure places so much emphasis on the fixity of
the linguistic sign, he has two problems: First, he must explain where the
source of this collective knowledge resides, how everyone happens to share
Pp. 46-47.
93. To be sure, highly culturally dependent concepts like politeness do not have the same relation-
ship to the "natural" world of things and the sensory stimuli they produce as do concepts like warmth.
Yet Saussure would probably say that the division between politeness and rudeness is only possible
because there is already a culture which classifies particular acts as being polite and rude, and this
previously existing set of shared cultural understandings is simultaneously demarcated and described
by language.
94. Pp. 49-50 (quoting F. D SAUSStRE, supra note 62, at 68-69).
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it, and how they all appear to share it equally well.95 Second, if individual
speakers have no control over the meaning of language, Saussure must
explain how linguistic change is ever possible. As we shall see, this diffi-
culty causes problems for Ellis' position.
Linguistic conventionalism is thus premised upon a conceptual opposi-
tion between societal conventions and individual acts of meaning, which
are parasitic upon those conventions. In Saussure's terminology, the oppo-
sition is between the systematic structural relationships of language, which
he calls langue, and the contingent speech acts within the community of
speakers, which he calls parole.9" But this conceptual opposition leads
naturally to reinterpretation as a nested opposition between conventions
and specific acts within those conventions, or put another way, between
structures and events.
To be a member of a language community is to be part of a form of life
which circumscribes the meanings that words can have. As Wittgenstein
suggests, one cannot say "bububu" and mean "[i]f it doesn't rain I shall
go for a walk." 7 On the other hand, one might have thought in 1900 that
one could not say "bad" and mean by it "good," yet Michael Jackson's hit
album Bad demonstrated the contrary. Although no particular speaker
can make "bad" mean "good," nevertheless languages do change, and they
can only change by collections of individual acts of speech.98 Someone has
to start using the word "bad" to mean "good" for the practice to catch
on-for this element of discourse to become a part of langue, to use Saus-
sure's terminology, or part of the language game, to use Wittgenstein's. If
linguistic meanings are fully fixed, then one must explain how it is possi-
ble to change them. If meaning requires fixity of conventions, then one
must explain how lapses in that fixity can occur while people still con-
tinue to understand each other.99
There are two possible solutions to this problem, and each undermines
Ellis' claims about the requirements of fixity in language. The first solu-
tion is that linguistic conventions are fixed, but that individuals in society,
deliberately or otherwise, misuse and pervert them. They break the rules
of the language game, and by breaking those rules, they create a new
language game. We can put to one side for the moment the problem of
95. Modern commentators on Saussure have pointed out that Saussure did not explain the mecha-
nism by which shared understandings are shared. See, e.g., R. HARRIS, READING SAUSSURE 196-203,
219-37 (1987).
96. F. DE SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 9-17.
97. L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 21, at 18.
98. F. DE SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 19, 98, 168.
99. This problem can be generalized to all systems of social convention. In many cases people who
have abandoned essentialism argue that meaning, or appropriate behavior, or justice, or legitimacy are
constituted by socially accepted conventions. The claim is also made that these conventions are more
or less fixed, and that fixity is necessary for the conventions to operate effectively. But in each case one
can raise the same question as to how change in conventions is possible while the conventions still
continue to operate.
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how this is possible given Ellis' assumption that meaning is fully depen-
dent upon fixed conventions. Yet if such disobediences can and do occur,
Wittgenstein's aphorism is incorrect-one can say "bububu" and mean by
it, "If it doesn't rain I shall go for a walk," or rather, one can make it
mean that if enough persons pick up the usage. Indeed, one can easily
imagine a group of philosophical wags saying "bububu" to each other
every day just to prove Wittgenstein wrong.100 If language changes by
manipulation or abuse of its conventions-by breaking the rules of the
language game-and yet meaning goes on all the same, it cannot be the
case that full fixity of meaning is necessary for meaning to occur. Only
relative fixity is required for language to operate, a point which Wittgen-
stein would clearly embrace, 101 but which apparently confounds Ellis, his
self-appointed disciple.
Moreover, the possibility of misuse and abuse of the language must be
inscribed within the conventions of language, for otherwise languages
would never grow or develop. Although language seems to rely upon fix-
ity of meaning in order for people to mean, the growth and development
of language depends upon the possibility of an abuse of the very same
system, upon the possibility of disobedience of the rules of the language
game. Put in Saussure's terms, langue is privileged over parole, but
langue ultimately depends upon parole, because langue is constituted and
shaped by acts of parole.102 Therefore a means of altering langue through
parole must exist-conventions must be subject to change through acts of
abuse or alteration. The inherent ability of signs to be used for unin-
tended or nonconventional purposes-the structural possibility of altering
or manipulating existing conventions-is one aspect of what deconstruc-
tive theory calls the "play" of signs.
In the alternative, one could argue, as Wittgenstein appears to do,'0 3
that people do not necessarily violate the rules of the language game as
language changes. Rather, language is never fully fixed, and the rules of
the language game are always incomplete. To use Derrida's terminology,
100. But of course, Wittgenstein would not really be proven wrong, for the philosophers would
have invented a new language game, or altered a previous one.
101. See infra text accompanying notes 110-11.
102. F. DE SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 19, 74, 98, 168. Change and growth in social conventions
thus depend upon constant disobedience or manipulation of the conventions. Conventions develop over
time only by people stretching their limits or otherwise reacting to them. Conventions are thus always
in a state of becoming, in a continuous dialectic between fixity and fluidity, between status quo and
rebellion.
An analogous, although by no means identical, point applies to biological evolution. In order for
species to survive, they must reproduce themselves through genetic replication and recombination.
Nevertheless, the transfer of genetic information from one generation to the next contains the possibil-
ity of variation or even mutation, which produces the changes that transform existing species or create
new ones. Thus, built into the mechanism of perpetuation and replication is the mechanism of differ-
entiation and evolution. Without replication of their genetic information, species cannot survive. With
perfect replication, however, species cannot evolve.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 110-11.
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one can argue that there is always a degree of play in the meanings of
words and concepts. This is a second aspect of the deconstructive concept
of "play"--the open possibilities of convention which are neither clearly
proscribed nor permitted in advance.10 4 Ellis is very much opposed to this
way of talking, especially to Derrida's substitution of the concept of
"play" for Saussure's concept of "difference."1 5 This substitution, he
points out, "says a great deal more . . . [it] suggest[s] that the mechanism
of differentiation is much less controlled and specific"' ' than Saussure's
theories of language allow. Once again interpreting Saussure to attack
Derrida, Ellis argues that language has meaning because the system of
differences is fixed-language may be just a system of differences, but
words have determinate meaning because their differences are balanced
against each other, like a house of cards. On the other hand, Ellis points
out, if there is "play" in the system of differences, our words have nothing
solid to push up against-the house of cards falls apart, and we have
meaninglessness instead of meaning. Black has meaning because it is con-
trasted to white and to other color terms. But if this contrast were uncer-
tain and indefinite, we could not know what the word black meant. Thus,
concludes Ellis, Derrida's concept of a "play" of differences is incoher-
ent-it cannot produce any meaning at all.10 7
Of course, deconstructive theory's point is that language means, and
continues to mean, despite the fact that there is considerable play in the
joints of language, or that linguistic conventions are subject to manipula-
tion and alteration. Similarly, any system of social conventions operates,
and continues to operate, despite the fact that it is potentially open or
potentially changeable.108
Ironically, Ellis' theory of language is most inconsistent with that of his
chosen philosophical role model, Ludwig Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein's
theory of language games assumes that linguistic conventions are never
fully complete-that we do, to some degree, make the rules up as we go
along. Indeed, no one was more insistent that the rules of a game need not
be all defined in advance than Wittgenstein, just as no one was more con-
cerned to show that we can get along quite nicely with concepts whose
104. Obviously, the line between what is an abuse of a convention and what is simply an exten-
sion that is neither required nor proscribed can be a matter of considerable debate among adherents to
the convention. The conceptual opposition between extending a convention and abusing or altering it
is a nested opposition. This means that there is both similarity and difference between the two activi-
ties. The deconstructive concept of "play" encompasses both phenomena. Nevertheless, it would be a




108. This is consistent with Saussure's point that change and continuity in language are intrinsi-
cally related. F. DE SAUSSURE, supra note 62, at 74. Thus, Saussure offers a somewhat more flexible
theory of language than Ellis ascribes to him.
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edges are blurred, or words whose meaning is not completely circum-
scribed in advance:
I can give the concept "number" rigid limits . . . but I can also use
it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier. And
this is how we do use the word "game." For how is the concept of a
game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer
does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none
has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when
you used the word "game.")
But then the use of the word is unregulated, the "game" we play
with it is unregulated. [This is Ellis' objection to Derrida. Wittgen-
stein responds]-It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no
more are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis,
or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too.109
In his eagerness to differentiate Derrida from Wittgenstein, Ellis has
missed a key point of similarity between the two thinkers. 1 0 If Wittgen-
stein merely believed that meaning was the result of a fixed set of conven-
tions, he would hardly have advanced much beyond the earlier theory of
nominalism, and he would be guilty of the same lack of originality with
which Ellis charges Derrida. However, Wittgenstein's insight was that
social conventions and language games are always potentially open-they
can be made more exact when necessary, but such exactness is not neces-
sary to speak meaningfully. The system of differences of which Saussure
speaks does not have to be fully articulable in advance in order for lan-
guage-or indeed for any system of meanings arbitrated by social conven-
tion-to function. The possibilities of further play are perfectly consistent
with the possibility of a meaningful discourse."' Thus, Wittgenstein, like
Derrida, points out that the meaning of our words is never fully complete
when we use words; rather, their meaning is always yet to be determined,
as new contexts and new problems arise.
Deconstructive arguments concerning language and play are important
because they apply by analogy to all other discourses that rely upon social
convention to establish meaning or value. Acts of meaning are dependent
upon social conventions, but social conventions grow and change because
of acts of meaning. Thus, the langue of manners and social expectations is
both differentiated from and dependent upon the parole of particular acts
of individuals in society. Structures and events are opposed, but their op-
109. L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 21, § 68.
110. We might even say that there is a nested opposition between their respective philosophies.
111. Note that when the linguistic conventions of langue are open in a particular situation, speak-
ers will determine how the convention is to be extended by individual speech acts of parole, which
will then be incorporated into langue. This is another instance of the conceptual dependence of
langue upon parole. This mutual conceptual dependence is what is meant by the claim that the
opposition of langue and parole is a nested opposition.
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position is always a nested opposition. That is why social practices and
customs are at once both fixed and subject to manipulation and metamor-
phosis. We now see that the deconstructive concept of "play" is just an-
other way of describing the mutual conceptual support and flux generated
by the langue and parole of any system of social conventions.1 12
In particular, the deconstructive critique of linguistic conventionalism
applies to conventionalism in legal theory. Legal theorists who accept
some degree of cultural relativism may doubt whether ethical and political
concepts like democracy, neutrality, or justice have a fully objective basis
outside of particular cultures. They may nevertheless insist that these con-
cepts have determinate meaning and application because they are the
product of social conventions. Although the ethical and political concepts
involved in legal discourse may vary from culture to culture, actors within
the legal culture are nevertheless constrained and bound by that culture's
conventions. Legal discourse is therefore always a debate within the con-
straints of these conventions.
For those legal theorists who do not believe in unchanging essences of
legal and political concepts, conventionalism is a valuable and appropriate
alternative. Yet we must remember that the deconstructive concept of play
applies equally well to the legal conventionalist as it does to the linguistic
conventionalist. Like linguistic conventions, legal conventions need not be
fully fixed in order to operate, and the possibility of play is always in-
scribed within them. The very conventions which constrain legal actors
are always open conventions, and are always susceptible to manipulation
and alteration. Thus any form of legal conventionalism also places us
within a particular dialectic of change and continuity, whose ground rules
are preserved by convention even as they are constantly undergoing
alteration.
The deconstructive concept of play can be easily misunderstood as a
claim of linguistic nihilism. It is therefore important to remember that the
argument is based upon a nested opposition between conventions of mean-
ing and individual acts of meaning, and not a false opposition. It is incor-
rect to conclude that conventions of meaning are wholly fluid-that they
offer no resistance to individual acts of meaning. A nested opposition in-
volves mutual dependence and differentiation. Our previous deconstruc-
tion has endeavored to show how conventionalism involves the possibility
of disobeying conventions and the fluidity of conventions, or in Saussure's
terms, how the development of langue depends upon the variations pro-
duced by parole. However, we should not by this argument forget the
strength of Ellis' earlier arguments. Parole depends upon langue as much
112. This ambivalent relation is particularly obvious in debates between advocates for and skep-
tic, of social change. Social practices resist alteration, but nevertheless mutate historically. Social his-
tory is the history of social change. Thus although change is invariably resisted, change is nevertheless
possible, although not always on the terms desired by its advocates.
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as langue depends upon parole. In fact, it would be impossible for "bad"
to come to mean "good" if "bad" did not already have a relatively fixed
meaning to play off of. "Bububu" could not come to mean "If it doesn't
rain I shall go out for a walk" unless the latter phrase had a relatively
determinate meaning. We can generalize this point to any system of social
conventions, including legal conventions. Derrida's notion of "play" is
thus dependent upon a baseline of conventions by which we can tell that
"play" or variation has occurred. The notion of indeterminacy requires a
concept of determinate meanings to play against. To say that we don't
know whether "bububu" means "take a walk" or "take a hike" presup-
poses a determinacy of meaning of the latter two phrases. Indeterminacy
is ultimately parasitic upon a form of determinacy.
Ellis sees this point clearly."1 3 However, because Ellis does not appreci-
ate the logic of a nested opposition, he mistakenly believes that he has
refuted deconstructive arguments about language and meaning-when he
has in fact confirmed them. A nested opposition between conventions and
individual acts of meaning, between structures and events, or between fix-
ity and free play, is a relation of mutual differentiation and dependence.
As a result, the more we focus on one side of the opposition, the more we
see that it depends upon the other, and vice versa. Once again it cannot be
stressed too much that the reinterpretation of a conceptual opposition as a
nested opposition does not abolish all boundaries or distinctions, but
merely resituates them so that we can see their similarity or mutual con-
ceptual dependence as well as their contrast and mutual differentiation.
V. CONCLUSION
The concept of nested opposition is important to legal theory if only
because it helps to clear up recurrent confusions about theoretical discus-
sion. Yet once we understand deconstructive arguments, we can see their
obvious connection to the legal forms of reasoning, which also depend
upon ascriptions of similarity and difference. For some persons decon-
struction no doubt is seen as the intrusion of a foreign element into law, in
more than one sense of the word. Deconstruction has arrived on the
American scene as one of the many European philosophical movements
that have accompanied the rise of interdisciplinary legal studies in general
and the Law and Literature and Critical Legal Studies movements in par-
ticular. Yet I believe that deconstruction has found a home in American
legal thought because one tradition of American legal theory has always
been in some sense deconstructive. When Critical Legal Studies scholars
began rediscovering the legal realists (who were not totally forgotten in
any case), they found that their arguments were as deconstructive as any-
113. P. 54; cf. p. 127 (ambiguity is parasitic upon specificity).
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thing in Derrida." 4 Thus, deconstructive argument already was present
in America's legal heritage by the time that more modern movements be-
gan to champion it.
To be sure, deconstructive techniques are more general in application
and broader in scope than the forms of reasoning lawyers are used to.
Deconstructive techniques are equally at home in non-doctrinal argu-
ment-they can be used in the study of legal ideology or intellectual his-
tory, or in all of the various types of jurisprudential debates that now rage
in the legal academy. But deconstruction is different from other interdisci-
plinary developments in that it makes its presence felt within legal dis-
course itself as well as outside of it. One can make a deconstructive argu-
ment within doctrine without ever once mentioning any of
deconstruction's special terminology or jargon."' Because the logic of law
is the logic of similarity and difference, deconstruction can dissolve into
legal discourse in a way that contributions from other disciplines often
cannot. At the same time, it can lurk outside of legal discourse when it is
employed for philosophical, historical, or ideological analysis. For those
who worry about the invasion of law by interdisciplinary studies, decon-
struction thus presents the strangest of cases. Deconstructive analysis and
legal analysis are at once both alien to each other and a part of each other.
They form, in other words, a nested opposition.
114. Indeed, one of the first and most important deconstructive articles, Gary Peller's The Meta-
physic6 of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1132 (1985), made this connection quite explicitly. I
also believe that Morris Cohen's "principle of polarity . . . that opposites . . . involve each other
when applied to any significant entity," is akin to a general statement that every conceptual opposition
can be reinterpreted as a nested opposition. M. COHEN, REASON AND NATURE 165 (1931).
115. See, e.g., Cohen, Properly and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927) (legal realist cri-
tique of public/private distinction); Hale, supra note 54 (deconstruction of distinction between co-
erced and non-coerced contracts through exploration of background coercion created by state's positive
law).
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